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ABSTRACT
Money launderers hide traces of their transactions with the involvement of
entities that participate in sophisticated schemes. Money laundering detection
requires unraveling concealed connections among multiple but seemingly
unrelated human money laundering networks, ties among actors of those
schemes, and amounts of funds transferred among those entities. The link
among small networks, either financial or social, is the primary factor that
facilitates money laundering. Hence, the analysis of relations among money
laundering networks is required to present the full structure of complex
schemes. We propose a framework that uses sequence matching, case-based
analysis, social network analysis, and complex event processing to detect
money laundering. Our framework captures an ongoing single scheme as an
event, and associations among such ongoing sequence of events to capture
complex relationships among evolving money laundering schemes. The
framework can detect associated multiple money laundering networks even in
the absence of some evidence. We validated the accuracy of detecting evolving
money laundering schemes using a multi-phases test methodology. Our test
used data generated from real-life cases, and extrapolated to generate more data
from real-life schemes generator that we implemented.
Keywords: Anti Money Laundering, Social Network Analysis, Complex
Event Processing
1. INTRODUCTION
Current Anti Money Laundering (AML) systems are designed to function
based on the requirements of adopting organization. They vary from the multicomponent and complex systems such as FINCEN (FAIS) to the specialized
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single-purpose systems used by banks to report Due Diligence and Suspicious
Activity Reports (SAR). To capture increasingly complex money laundering
schemes (MLS) call for integrating new techniques such as Social Network
Analysis (SNA) (Wasserman et al., 1994), in addition to the already used rule
based analysis and risk modeling. An efficient AML system must have many
components, where some components are being purely deterministic and others
being purely probabilistic. An example of a probabilistic component is the risk
analysis, and SNA is an example of a deterministic component. Generally,
deterministic models consider social aspects and statistical models consider
financial aspects (Wasserman et al., 1994).
The FINCEN AI System (FAIS) (Senator et al., 1995, 1996, 1998) designed
for internal use analyzes SARs filed by banks. The system combines offline
SAR data analyzed by human experts to identify possible hidden linkage
among transactions using link analysis techniques. However, FAIS (Senator et
al., 1995, 1996, 1998) only links and evaluates the database (DB) of the
reported suspicious transactions offline. KDPrevent (Jacobs et al., 2003; Kuns
et al., 2004) by KDLabs, a commercial product/service utilized by banks in
Switzerland collect customer, account and transaction information for offline
analysis, combining data-mining techniques with expert legal knowledge of
legal experts.
Two models of sequence matching and link analysis (Liu et al., 2008; Schwartz
et al., 2008) are relevant to our research in detecting evolving patterns of
sequence. Liu (Liu et al., 2008) proposes a sequence matching algorithm to
discover suspicious transaction sequences, using transaction histories of an
individual’s accounts and transaction information histories from a peer group.
(Liu et al., 2008) focus only on the bank transactions, without covering other
financial transactions such as stock market. Schwartz (Schwartz et al., 2008)
proposes a model to find criminal networks using social network analysis,
building upon Borgatti’s SNA-based key player approach (Schwartz et al.,
2008). One drawback of Borgatti's model is the failure to assign weights to
actors and actor-actor relationships. Gunestas, et al.’s framework (Gunestas et
al., 2008, 2010) is similar to ours, but with a narrower focuses on detecting
Ponzi schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the Money
Laundering Evolution Detection Framework (MLEDF) and Section 3 describe
proposes a new ML detection algorithm. Section 4 evaluates the performance
results of MLEDF using real-life cases. Section 5 describes related work and
Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2. MONEY LAUNDERING EVOLUTION DETECTION FRAMEWORK
(MLEDF)
The framework is composed of four different phases. Each phase will
communicate with the next phase, and the output generated from each phase is
sent into the next phase. The phases and their function are explained below.
Transaction Data Collection: The transaction agents or data input collectors
from Automated Clearing House such as (EPN, FEDWIRE, and CHIPS) will
send in their data format. The different types of transaction data are: Banking,
Stock market, Derivative market, Web Services, Trading, Electronic Money,
and Money Brokering. Once the industry-specific transaction data is gathered,
relevant information is extracted for analysis. For example, there are more than
20 fields in stock order forms and we use only time, sender, receiver, price,
quantity, symbol, market, sellerOrderID, buyerOrderID, tradeID, and country.
Also, we use transaction-independent data used in the analysis, such as the
economic status of the country, sales trends of the stock, and the stock value
during the day.
1. Data Processing: The data collected from different systems are used to
create patterns of the well-known MLS (Mehmet et al., 2010). The MLSrelated data that is extracted from the streaming events is filtered before
submitting them into the detection algorithms. The extracted data associated
with each MLS pattern assigned to a specific MLS type using the following
components:
a) Business Rules: MLS business rules and red flags associated with
each pattern, the rules associated with specific sector are used by the
MLS detection algorithms to identify the MLS patterns.
b) MLS Template: Well-known MLS templates will be used during this
phase. Currently, the templates have seven major pattern types with
their different subtype combinations. This acts as a repository of
known MLS. If a new form of MLS is discovered, then it will be
added to this DB.
c) ML Economic Models: Three ML economic models (Mehmet et al.,
2013) will be used to validate and increase the accuracy of the
detection algorithms for well-known ML patterns. Those economic
models determine if the evolution of MLS is within the accepted
trend of the models.
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Figure 1The MLEDF framework

2. MLS Algorithms and MLS Network Detection: There are six major
heterogeneous algorithm modules (Smurfing, Trade, Stock, Derivative,
EMoney, DirtyEFT). Each algorithm uses a different method to capture the
network associated with the specific type of MLS. In real-time, the
algorithms output, the discovered networks associated with the specific MLS
patterns, each into a different database. Then, the discovered networks are
reformatted and saved in a single database referred to as the “Network”
Database. This process facilitates faster and efficient analysis of the links
among MLS networks.
3. Evolution Detection Analysis and Generating the Fraud Trail and
Suspicious Trail: Four separate algorithms are run to find the “Full-Trail”,
“Missing-Trail”, and “Suspicious-Trail” (Mehmet et al., 2013) of MLS
networks, and saved in separate databases. Full-Trail is a long series of
MLS’s that span over many countries and involves many cycles of MLS. In
essence, it is a concatenated sequence of related schemes (MLS) act in itself
to transfer money from one MLS to the other until it reaches the final MLS,
where we refer to the orchestrator (i.e., the money launderer) as the
“EndBoss” in the final MLS. Any MLS or trail will have the originator
“StartBoss” and the terminator “EndBoss”, in addition to the associates that
maintain the MLS or trail. The “Associates” are the list of the people
involved in the sequence of detected fraud. The “StartBoss” is the entity
whom starts the MLS or trail. Missing-Trail is a short Full-Trail that does
not exceed the depths of three related MLSs. We assume that the MissingTrail is a premature Full-Trail with broken parts and missing links or
evidence. A Suspicious-Trail is a combination of discovered Full-Trails
and/or Missing-Trails, it will be constructed using algorithms that
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incorporate SNA and numerical analysis techniques. The module “Detection
Analysis” (Mehmet et al., 2013) determines the evolution of the “FullTrail”s such as the change to the number of involved associates, the changes
to the cost of laundering, and changes to the laundering locations.
2.1 MLS Pattern Detection Modules in MLEDF
MLEDF process is fed by data from many types of transaction data, where
each feed is from a particular market or a finance industry. The main detection
module is divided into sub-modules, where each sub-module detects money
laundering patterns relevant to that specific market. This is because the data set
of each market and industry is different than others and the money laundering
techniques differ between them. MLEDF uses a core set of business rules to
detect the evolution of MLS reported annually by FATF, with six detection
patterns for each finance sector that we chose to include in our experiment.
2.2 Gathering Transaction Data and Generation of the Transaction
Evidence Data
A “Message” sent between two parties in the framework consists of the
following components: (1) Common Mandatory Fields: Sender, Receiver,
Time, Transaction ID, and a field that reflects the amount of funds transferred
or price of the transaction; (2) Pattern Specific Mandatory Fields: A set of
attributes pertinent to the transaction type. For example, the Smurfing
transaction will have only the "EFT" field that reflects whether the banking
transaction is an EFT or not. The stock transaction has more fields as in
"Quantity, Symbol, Market, TradeID, Country, etc."; and (3) Auxiliary Third
Party Fields: The framework retrieves critical data from third party sources,
used in conjunction with the transaction data. The auxiliary data includes
information such as recent market stock and derivative data, current product
market price, and country economic status. This data is used to compare the
transaction price and product price with the nominal price.
The “Comprehensive Output” is the MLS pattern-specific output generated by
the MLS detection algorithm. As seen in figure 2, the output produces
comprehensive evidence for each detected pattern, and it is different from other
patterns. The output is saved in a separate database. For example, the field
“Associates” exists in most of the outputs, it is a list of the people involved in
the sequence of detected fraud. The size of the list varies because the list will
expand as the money transfers from one entity to the next entity, until it
reaches the final destination or terminates with a fund withdrawal.
The number of the transactions (which can be modeled as steps in an event)
required to create a MLS vary based on the MLS type. We link the set of
transactions that constitute the comprehensive-output for a specific MLS. Any
previously examined transaction that is related to the current transaction under
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examination is linked to the output of the current transaction, if the transactions
share common fields and involve a fund transfer. For example, all the
associates who are involved in a Smurfing fraud will be placed in the list of
“Associates”, and the manipulator is represented in the field “Boss”.
All the data gathered from pattern detection are reduced to the minimum set
that represents what we define as the “Network”, which constitutes the entities
created the MLS and information about MLS. These entities are “EndBoss”,
“StartBoss”, and “Associates”. The “Network” DB contains fields of
participants and vital information of a detected MLS. Each network will be
assigned a unique ID. The nine fields in the “Network” are: NetworkID,
EndBoss, StartBoss, AmountLaundered, Associates, Type, DetectionTime,
StartTime, EndTime. A network can be associated only with one type of MLS;
therefore, the field “Types” represents the various well-known types of MLS
(Mehmet et al., 2010).
The evolution-output “Detection-Schema” is generated by the “DetectionAnalysis” module. The DB “Detection-Schema” contains information about
the evolution of the ML trail, such as information of average cost and average
number of associates used in each of the sequence of MLSs in the Full-Trail.

Figure 2 The “Comprehensive Output” (DB content) of the Output of Six MLS
Detection Algorithms

3. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS MODULE TO CREATE A
“SUSPICIOUS-TRAIL”
There are many cases in which money launderers intentionally obfuscate the
money laundering trail, either by hiding it (for instance by increasing the
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transaction quantity and reducing the transaction amount), or performing it in a
none-reported method as in Hawala. It becomes the task of an AML to detect
these concealed relations and transactions. As a solution, we offer an additional
module for social network analysis among transactions to unravel the hidden
relations among MLS networks. MLEDF is designed from bottom-up with the
concept of detecting and linking MLS trails (networks) even with missing
evidence.
The major task of this module is to detect components of an actual “Full-Trail”
even if there is a missing piece of evidence. The module will investigate the
available trails (Full-Trail and Missing-Trail) by using our SNA DB that
contains the weights of relationships among MLS participants. This is in order
to determine if two trails are related by considering some attributes such as the
amount of funds involved, location, affinity of participants, time, and methods
used for laundering.
The SNA module is more resource consuming when compared to other
modules, due to the extensive use of SNA, and link and weight calculations.
The “Suspicious-Trail” module uses the “SNA” module to produce a new trail.
This new trail contains two or more trails that are related based on SNA, even
if we do not have captured a transaction joining them or any other evidence.
The new trail is created after making a scientific calculation based on (SNA)
results of a possible relationship between two or more “Full-Trails” and
“Missing-Trails”.
The generated evolution patterns and strategies are collected into the
“Suspicious-Trail” Database. This module contains the “SNA” sub-module that
calculates and assesses the social network connections of individuals, peergroups, and money laundering trails. The sub-module “SNA” is used to derive
the associated suspicious trails based on the techniques of SNA. The table
“Weight” that is used within the module is completely constructed with data
output from running the “SNA” module.
3.1 Using Complex Event Processing in the Social Network Analysis
Module
Any MLS has the originator “StartBoss” and the terminator “EndBoss”, in
addition to the associates that maintains the MLS. The output of MLS detection
algorithms contains information about the participants, in addition to
information such as amount laundered, final amount of funds, type of MLS,
duration and start and end time. The critical question that ML experts contend
to answer is “How fast and how well can we relate the different events in this
universe of detected MLS?” Using the introduction of Complex Event
Processing (CEP) systems like StreamBase, we developed an algorithm to
create the full and accurate chains of related MLSs, such relations are used to
transfer a fund to the next MLS until it reaches the final destination. That is,
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the flow of the dirty money never stops until it reached the ultimate account.
This cycle continues until it reached the final destination where the money
launderer withdraws the money. Current AML systems have scalability issues
in associating the multitude of different events of various MLS. We model
each detected MLS as an event, and have various patterns of events categorized
under six different types of MLS. For example, Full-Trail algorithm outputs a
trail by using the functionality of CEP of perceiving the MLSs as a set of
events. Without the CEP the MLS should dissolve into the constituent
transactions to be analyzed and linked with the other transactions from another
MLS (Time consuming and resource consuming). The CEP can link MLSs,
perceived as events, using various criterions without the need to add more
complex sub-algorithms for each criterion. That is, the Full-Trail connects the
dots that exist, but it is harder and slower to connect them without CEP
capabilities. Full-Trail captures the trail in cases where all evidence is
available, whereas the Suspicious-Trail attempts to construct the path where
some edges along the path is missing.
3.2 Integrating the “SNA” Module into MLEDF
The major objective of the “SNA” module is to detect components of a
undiscovered Full-Trails by performing analysis on the four databases
“Network”, “Detection-Schema”, “Full-Trail”, and “Missing-Trail”. During the
relationship analysis stage, the SNA module investigate the available trails, by
using SNA Database that contains the weight of relations to determine if two
trails are related considering attributes, such as amount of funds involved,
geography, affinity of participants, time, method for laundering, relation.
The module “SNA” analyzes the end and start points (“EndBoss” and
“StartBoss”) of discovered transaction sequence (trail) to discover any broken
parts of such none-discovered trail. This analysis includes assessing the social
relationships between the endpoints (“EndBoss” and “StartBoss”) of trails with
each other, using the DB created that includes different level of relationships.
The participants and bosses of money laundering trails may change, but the key
players stay the same and they swap roles (Mehmet et al., 2013).
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Figure 3 The Process of Generating Evidence Data in the MLEDF

3.3 Input from Algorithmic Modules and their Databases into
the “SNA” Module
This section describes modules called inside the MLEDF and feed their output
(DB) as an input to the “SNA” module.
1. “Full-Trail” module: We create the long trail “Full-Trail” of complex MLS
series that span over many countries. A “Full-Trail” is a concatenated
sequence of related ML schemes acts as a whole to transfer money from one
MLS to another. A “StartBoss” of a “Full-Trail” is the “StartBoss” of the
first MLS in the series of MLS that constitute the “Full-Trail”. Whereas the
“EndBoss” of a “Full-Trail” is the “EndBoss” of the last MLS in the MLS
series that constitute the “Full-Trail”. We detect the “StartBoss” and the
“EndBoss” of the Full-Trail, along with intermediary bosses of linked
schemes. The “StartBoss” is the earliest known launderer (that we have
proven evidence for) that initiates the sequence of ML transactions. The
“EndBoss” is the final launderer that withdraws the funds or transfers them
using remittance (Hawala) systems that do not keep any financial records.
We start with the “EndBoss” and compute the laundering path towards its
beginning. Then we follow all possible paths that originate at the detected
launderer “StartBoss” and link to another launderer. During concatenation
of the schemes we consider the amount of funds involved, geography,
affinity of participants, time, relation, and method for laundering.
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Table 1 Sample Output of the Full-Trail (Up to maximum of 30 related MLS networks)
TrailI
D

Duration

Withdraw

Amount

24, 51, 67, 92, ….

1932

56 Days

Yes

2, 15, 98, 126, …..

72468

99 Days

415, 783, 999, …..

97246

92 Days

Networks

Start
Boss

End
Boss

988,000

Boss
756

Boss
17

No

1,213,234

Boss
29

Boss
592

Yes

1,050,230

Boss
324

Boss
75

2. “Missing-Trail” module: We create short trails that do not exceed the depth
of three consecutive MLSs, or three levels depth of MLSs. We assume that
Missing-Trail is a premature Full-Trail with broken parts and missing
evidence. Therefore we capture such shorter trails for “Suspicious-Trail”
analysis by saving them in the “Missing-Trail” DB.
Table 2 Sample Output of the Missing-Trail (Do not exceed 3 related MLS networks)
Start
Boss

End
Boss

23,234

Boss
56

Boss
151

No

90,165

Boss
170

Boss
882

No

200,230

Boss
884

Boss
975

Networks

TrailID

Duration

Withdraw

Amount

14, 219,921

1232

16 Days

No

2452, 315

1208

29 Days

405, 7831

97246

19 Days

3. Evolution-Detection module: We analyze the input feed from “Full-Trail”

and “Missing-Trail” algorithms, and generate DB “ML-Networks” and DB
“Detection-Schema”. The DB “ML-Network” contains three DBs of “BossBoss”, “Boss-Associate” and “Associate-Associate”. The three DBs reflect
the all discovered pair relationships among bosses and associates of MLSs
and trails. An associate is a participant of the MLS who facilitates the
success of MLS, such as the deposit makers in smurfing or the stock broker
in stock based MLS. The DB “Detection-Schema” contains statistical
information about the evolution of the ML trail, such as information of
average cost and average number of associates used in each MLs of the
sequence of MLSs in the Full-Trail. Table 3 shows the shortened output of
the detected schema of the real-life case.
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Table 3 Sample Shortened Output of Detection-Schema
Detection
Time

Type

SubType

Networ
kID

Location

StartBoss

EndBoss

20120915114

HiLo

Hi

2213

USA

Boss756

Boss 17

20120819139

Stock

LowSale

9786

Germany

Boss 324

Boss 75

Associates

Cost

Amount

Withdrawal Time

Start Time

End Time

A, B, G, U

25,000

1,825,000

20120915114

20120830

20120915

N, O, W, Y

14,700 1970,000

20120819124

20120725

20120819

The “SNA” module will use the content of the DBs produced by the three
evidence generation algorithms as an input. The contents of the output
generated from the three modules listed in above tables will be saved into three
DB named “Detection-Schema” DB, “Full-Trail” DB, and “Missing-Trail” DB.
Every algorithm will create a DB with the same name of the algorithm name.
Additionally, the DB “Network” associated with each MLS type will also feed
into the SNA module.
3.4 The Components and Output of the “SNA” Module
The SNA module will generate the two Databases as outputs. The
“SuspectWeight” Database contains the weight of all different relations
detected in the MLEDF. The “Relations” Database contains the record of
business and family relations among pairs based on the assumption that we
have access to such records. The method to calculate the calculation is
explained in the next section. The “SNA” module continuously updates the
“SuspectWeight” with the value (score) of existing relations among the entities
existing in all the DBs created in the MLEDF.
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Table 4 Components of the Two DB Output of SNA

RelationshipDB ( hash string, #"time" timestamp, type string, person1
string, person2 string) PRIMARY KEY (hash, #"time", type) USING
BTREE;
SuspectWeightDB (hash string, UniqueTrailBosses long,
UniqueTrailAssociates long, UniqueMissingTrailAssociates long,
SchemaBosses long, SchemaAssociateBoss long, SchemaAssociate long,
family long, business long, weight long)
PRIMARY KEY (hash)
USING BTREE;

Figure 4 Sections of the Social Network Analysis Module

The SNA module contains nine sections to continuously update the two
Databases. Section 1 through 6 creates hashes of various relations. The sections
7 through 9 update, query, and calculate SNA weight of family, business, and
various ML relations derived in earlier stages. The hash of binary relations,
that involves pair of entities, is used as the basis to calculate the accumulative
relations of every type. The sections list is as follows:
a. Section 1: Creates Hashes for all “StartBoss” and “EndBoss” relations,
we refer to it as “Hash SchemaBosses”. The “StartBoss” and
“EndBoss” are unique to a MLS.
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b. Section 2: Creates Hashes for all detected “Boss-Associate” relations
we call “HashBossesAssociate”.
c. Section 3: Creates Hashes for all detected “Associate-Associate”
relationships. This hash represents the combinations of relationships
among the associates of the same MLS, even if they do not
interact/transact with each other directly.
d. Section 4: Creates Hashes for “StartBoss”-“EndBoss” pairs of FullTrails, we call “HashFullTrailBosses”.
e. Section 5: Creates Hashes for “Relationships” among socially or
business-wise related pairs.
f. Section 6: Creates Hashes for the associated (related) Full-Trail’s and
Missing-Trail’s, we call “AggregateOfAssociatedTrails”. This hash
contains a pair of TrailIDs, which are unique IDs assigned to each
detected trail. The hash is used to relate trails by their TrailIDs.
g. Section 7: Inserts all the outputs (hashes) of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and
6 into “SuspectWeight” DB, using “FirstInsert”.
h. Section 8: Queries the “SuspectWeight” for the continuously updated
outputs (hashes of Sections 1-6), then, feed the updated hashes values
into last section.
i. Section 9: Calculate the accumulative weight of relations using the
“UpdatedWeight”, updating the “Relationship” table, and then
updating the “SuspectWeight” with updated result combined from the
new calculated weight and with “SuspectWeight”. The formula
(method) used in this stage to sum up the accumulative weight, by
adding the hash relations from Sections 1 through 6, is explained
below in the next section, This final and updated weight will be used in
the “Suspicious-Trail” module to link trails among each other.
3.5 Social Network Analysis Algorithm
The “Social Network Analysis” algorithm computes the weight for different
relationships involving the bosses and associates of MLS and trails. The values
of the weights are chosen based on the importance of relation in a scheme, that
is to say a relation of certain type is not treated equally as a relation with less
importance. Also the margin of weights chosen allowing an iteration of certain
relation to be equal in weight value to another relation with a higher weight, for
example two “Boss-Associate” relations is value wise equal to one “BossBoss” relation.
A relationship weight is defined for each possible associate couple. The larger
the weight, the more likely the relationship between two entities to occur.
Weight is calculated by adding parameters for each of the corresponding
events; therefore, the result is considered as the relationship weight.
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a.

For each detected schema, 10 will be added to start/end boss couple, 5
for each boss/associate combination, and 1 for each associate/associate
non-repeating combination.

b.

For each missing trail, 15 will be added to each associate non-repeating
combination.

c.

The full trails will add 20 to each associate combination and 25 to the
start and end boss.

d.

Other strong relationships are also counted, family ties will add 250 to
the couple, and each business relationship will add 250 to the couple.

1 SET BUSINESS as 250; FAMILY as 250; FULL_BOSS as 25;
FULL_ASSOCIATE
as
SCHEMA_BOSS as 10;
2

20;

MISSING_ASSOCIATE

as

15;

SCHEMA_ASSOACIATEBOSS as 5; SCHEMA_ASSOCIATE as 1;
FUNCTION String HASH (String person1, String person2)

3

{return concatenate(sort(person1,person2))};
STREAM DetectionInputStream DetectionSchema detectedMLS;
STREAM RelationshipInput RelationshipSchema relationship;
STREAM MissingTrailInputStream MissingTrailSchema missingTrail;

4
5

STREAM FullTrailInputStream FullTrailSchema fullTrail;
STORE hashRelations IN hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB;
UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H
SET suspectSchemaBoss++

6

WHERE
H.hash
detectedMLS.endBoss);

==

HASH(detectedMLS.startBoss,

UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H
SET suspectSchemaAssociateBoss++
7

WHERE
H.hash
detectedMLS.endBoss);

==

HASH(detectedMLS.associate,

UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H
8

SET suspectSchemaAssociateBoss++
WHERE
H.hash
detectedMLS.startBoss);

==
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FOR EACH detectedMLS.associates as assoc1
FOR EACH detectedMLS.associates as assoc2
9

UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H
SET suspectSchemaAssociate++
WHERE H.hash == HASH(assoc1, assoc2);
FOR EACH fullTrail.associates as assoc1
FOR EACH fullTrail.associates as assoc2

10

UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H
SET suspectFullAssociate = suspectFullAssociate++
WHERE H.hash == HASH(assoc1, assoc2);

11 UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H
SET suspectFullBoss = suspectFullBoss++
WHERE H.hash == HASH(fullTrail.startBoss, fullTrail.endBoss);
FOR EACH missingTrail.associates as assoc1
FOR EACH missingTrail.associates as assoc2
12

UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H
SET suspectSchemaBoss = suspectMissingAssociate++
WHERE H.hash == HASH(assoc1, assoc2);
UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberemoryDB as H

13

SET suspectBusiness = suspectBusiness + 1
WHERE H.hash == HASH(relationship.person1, relationship.person2)
AND relationship.type == "BUSINESS";
UPDATE hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H

14

SET suspectFamily = suspectFamily + 1
WHERE H.hash == HASH(relationship.person1, relationship.person2)
AND relationship.type == "FAMILY";
SELECT H.hash,
(FULL_ASSOCIATE*H.suspectFullAssociate +
FULL_BOSS*H.suspectFullBoss +
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MISSING_ASSOCIATE*H.suspectMissingAssociate +
SCHEMA_ASSOCIATE*H.suspectSchemaAssociate +
SCHEMA_ASSOCIATEBOSS*H.suspectSchemaAssociateBoss +
SCHEMA_BOSS*H.suspectSchemaBoss +
BUSINESS*H.suspectBusiness
WeightOutputStream

+FAMILY*H.suspectFamily)

as

FROM hashAndRelationsNumberMemoryDB as H;
Query 1 The Social Network Analysis Algorithm

In steps 1 and 2, we define the constants associated with the different weights
and the hash functions. In steps 3 and 4, we create the input feeds and local
(temporary) MemoryDB. In steps 5 through 8, we create the hashes of “BossBoss”, “Boss-Associate”, and “Associate-Associate” of MLSs. In steps 9
through 11, we create the same hashes of Full-Trails. In steps 12 and 13, we
create the hash for family and business “Relations”. In step 14, we calculate the
WeightOutput of a hash H.
3.6 The “Suspicious-Trail” Analysis Module
Using the “SNA” module, the “Suspicious-Trail” module produces a new trail
that contains the full path of an evolution, after making a scientific assumption
of a possible relation between two or more “Full-Trail” and “Missing-Trail”
lists. This module continuously calls the “SNA” module to fetch the social
network connections of individuals, peer-groups, and money laundering trails.
The sub-module “SNA” is used to derive the associated suspicious trails based
on SNA techniques to calculate the link weight (ML relations found in all
MLEDF DBs) and attribute (business and family relations) weight among trail
actors. The table “Weight” that is used within the “Suspicious-Trail” module is
completely constructed with data output from running the “SNA” module. The
generated evolution patterns and strategies are collected into the “SuspiciousTrail” Database.
3.7 Suspicious-Trail Algorithm
The “Suspicious-Trail” algorithm searches for missing and hidden links among
ML trails. The analysis starts with any new “Full-Trail” with no more than 30
networks (step 5). Then, the current “Full-Trail” is matched with each trail that
complies with (step 6):
a. Having ±10% of the current “Full-Trail” amount.
b. A time window of 90 days between both trails’ timestamps.
c. Location of first network of current “Full-Trail” is the same as the
location of the last network of possible “Full-Trail” match.
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d. Weight between current “Full-Trail” first boss and possible match
last boss is larger than 1000.
e. All matches are then treated separately as study cases and related to
the current “Full-Trail” forming a “Suspicious-Trail” (steps 7 and
8).
1 SET NetworkLimit as 30; Similar_FundPercentage as 0.1;
SET DayWindow as 90; SET WeightRelation as 1000
2 STREAM FullTrailInputStream FullTrailSchema Trails;
3 STREAM SNAOutputStream WeightSchema weight;
4 STORE Trails IN TrailsMemoryDB
5 SELECT Trails FROM Trails WHERE
(Trails.lenght <= NetworkLimit);
6 SELECT Trails, db as matchTrails FROM Trails as m, TrailsMemoryDB
as db WHERE
((m.finalAmount
current.finalAmount) AND

*

Similar_FundPercentage

<

(m.finalAmount > db.finalAmount* Similar_FundPercentage)
AND
7

((m.detectionTime-db.detectionTime)

<=

days(DayWindow))

AND
(lastelement(db.networks).location
firstelement(m.networks).location));
8

==

SELECT CONCATENATE(t,m) as SuspectedTrailOutputStream
FROM Trails as m, matchTrails as t, weight as w WHERE
w.hash ==
WeightRelation;

sort(t.startBoss,m.endBoss)

AND

w.weight

>=

SELECT CONCATENATE(m,t) as SuspectedTrailOutputStream
FROM Trails as m, matchTrails as t, weight as w WHERE
w.hash ==
WeightRelation;

sort(m.startBoss,t.endBoss)

AND

w.weight

>=

Query 2 The Suspicious-Trail Analysis Algorithm

In step 1, we define the constants associated with limits set to relate and
compare trails. In steps 2 through 4, we create the input feeds including the
SNA-generated Weight DB, and local (temporary) DB TrailsMemoryDB. In
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step 5, we filter the analyzed trails that do not exceed 30 levels. In step 6, we
compare and link trails that match based on criteria listed above. In steps 7 and
8, we concatenate the matching trail with another trail, either trail or matching
trail leading the generated outcome.
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
It hard to obtain real-life data in the domain of ML, where one can find some
samples used to explain complex real-life cases. Therefore we approached
several organizations to collect sanitized real-life cases that validate the testing
of MLEDF, meeting the requirements imposed by the organization that
provided the sanitized cases. Our case studies are based on data provided from
the organization we refer as Trusted Third Party (TTP), which is legally
allowed to collect information and track records of financial exchange. The
identity of the TTP cannot be disclosed due to a Non-Disclosure Agreement.
The sanitized cases were provided on the basis of having the MLEDF also
tested in the infrastructure of TTP.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Using the real-life dataset, we generate a larger dataset that contains different
levels of random transaction using a module we implemented using Java. We
used a template from real-life cases to generate the synthetic data that is similar
to those cases by selecting a subset of t real-life cases to create more samples
and develop new patterns, based on criteria such as preserving duration
flexibility, geography variation, multitude of fund transferred, crowded trails,
trails with low funds, complex instruments such as derivative products,
continuous transition from one financial sector to the other, splitting a
transaction with large fund into many connected small funded MLSs, etc.
Once we generate artificial data sets we unite all the databases to create a large
dataset to be inserted into the MLEDF for validation and testing. All the
“endBoss” and “startBoss” of trails and generated MLS series are compared
against the detected ones of MLEDF. The same test was repeated with inserted
random patterns of small trails and MLSs in some interval to confuse the
MLEDF and test the false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR).
By adding a combination of randomly generated MLS series we imitate the
daily production environment of stock brokerage and a retail bank. The real
validation test for MLEDF is accomplished by assessing its ability to detecting
patterns with accuracy in a noisy environment, similar to the real life
transactions that are filled with noise.
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4.2 Using Real-Life Cases in the Validation Test of the MLEDF

Figure 5 Real-Life Case of Evolved and Sophisticated MLS

Our test case spans over 5 countries involving 11 companies, 10 associates,
and 8 innocent entities. As shown in Figure 5 and Table 5, the scheme has 3
different full trail cycles. The laundered amount is lower than the amount
transferred by the “StartBoss” of the cycle. The amounts in the case only
reflect the amount laundered, either by gaining and losing, or by means of
transferring the value. The amount does not represent the full amount of the
transaction, which is higher than the amount laundered. The masterminds of
the scheme are Company1 and “EndBoss”, based on the information provided
to us by TTP. The sub-cycles of the case occur independently of each other and
each has different rounds. Each round in each sub-cycle is in tandem with other
rounds of the same sub-cycle. The information of individuals and companies,
locations, and dates are all sanitized.
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Table 5 The Subcycles and Rounds of the Full-Trail of the Real-life Case
Cycle
StartBoss

Cycle
EndBoss

Participants

Rounds

Company1

Money
Launderer

15

5

Company1

Money
Launderer

4

3

Company3

Money
Launderer

5

3

Laundered
Amount
$260,000
$185,000
$185,000

4.3 Experimental Evaluation
We introduced a three phase testing prototype to examine MLEDF and
detection algorithms. All of the three phases focused on testing and validating
the components of MLS, Full-Trails, and Suspicious-Trails. The first phase
focus on testing all components and the other tests focus on Full-Trail and
Suspicious-Trail components.
Table 6 Used Testing and Validation Methodology
Test-Validation Type

Patterns Used

Pattern Generation Method

Test (I)Without Noise

Single MLS,

StreamBase-Generated single MLS

Missing-Trail,

StreamBase-Feed Pair of MLS

Full-Trail

Feed Full-Trail's from Real-life Cases

Entities,

Inject same entities into Full-Trail

Transactions,

Inject subtle transactions into Full-Trail

Single MLS

Inject similar MLS into same Full-Trail

Test (II)Subtle Noise

Test (III)Controlled
Data

30LDeep Full-Trail Create 30 levels vertically deep trails
20LDeep Full-Trail Create 20 levels vertically deep trails
10LDeep Full-Trail Create 10 levels vertically deep trails
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Table 7 Defining False Negative Rate for Each Test Phase
Test

Patterns Used

FNR

Test I

Single MLS,

Detected MLS list is less than the input list

Pair MLS,

Detected MLS pairs is less than the input list, or MLS pair is
detected as single MLS
Detected Full-Trail list is less than the input list, or Full-Trail is
detected as Missing-Trail’s (shorter trails) and single MLSs

Full-Trail
Test II Entities,

Missed detection of MLS, because similar participants injected

Transactions,

Missed detection of MLS, because identical transactions injected

Single MLS

Missed detection of trail, because similar MLS injected

Test III 30L-Deep

20L-Deep

30L-Deep is missed in detection, and it will cause to be detected as
(FPR) other level deep combination of Full-Trail (less than 30L),
Missing Trails and MLS
Missed detection, and causing generation of FPR of Full-Trail (less
than 20L), Missing Trails and MLS
Missed detection, and causing generation of FPR of Full-Trail (less
than 10L), Missing Trails and MLS

10L-Deep

Table 8 Defining False Positive Rate for Each Test Phase
Test Patterns Used FPR
Test Single MLS,
I
Pair MLS,
Full-Trail

Not possible as MLS is either detected or missed, as there is no noise
Not possible as MLS pair is either detected or missed, in no-noise data
Full-Trail is not captured, instead MLS pairs, MLS triple, or shorter
Full-Trails are captured in lieu of the Full-Trail

Test Entities,
Detect MLS with different participants (Associate and/or Boss)
II
Transactions, Detect MLS with different participants (Associate and/or Boss)
Single MLS
Test 30LDeep
III
20LDeep

Missed detection of the actual Full-Trail. Instead of that MLS, MissingTrails and shorter Full-Trails that form the actual Full-Trail captured
Full-Trail of desired depth (10L, 20L, 30 L) is not captured, instead a
combination of Full-Trail of less depth, Missing-Trail, and MLS are
captured in lieu of the actual Full-Trail

10LDeep
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Test without noise: This is designed to test every module of MLEDF,
including detection algorithms and trail analysis modules. These tests evaluate
the FPR and FNR by comparing the results of the test with the data feed that
contains the patterns of single MLS, pair of MLSs, and Full-Trails. The desired
result is to have a list of the validation result identical to the list in the data
feed. We test the efficiency to keep up with the speed of the data feed by using
the time window feature in the StreamBase (StreamBase 2012, 2014). By
setting the time window to glide over only one event at a time tick in the
StreamBase system, we required the detection algorithms to be fast at normal
speed of one event at one time tick of the CEP system. By design, algorithm
that cannot attain the speed of event production will not be able to capture
MLS events or the Full-Trail, thereby generating false negatives.
Each of the six detection algorithms are tested with its own dataset feeds in
order to verify that we detect without FPR and FPR. The algorithm-specific
dataset feed is generated using the built in feed generator working with our
pattern specific event generator. Afterwards, we tested the “Missing-Trail” by
feeding linked pairs of MLSs into the MLEDF. The linked/related pairs are
randomly selected from the set of six types of MLS. As mentioned, any pair of
linked MLS will make it to “Missing-Trail” and not into “Full-Trail”, due to
the required depth. Moreover, we finally tested the detection and evolution of
“Full-Trail”s by feeding trails generated using the various laundering strategies
of the real-life cases.
The process of creating the “Full-Trail” will start with creating an MLS type
out of the six MLS types of Smurfing, Trading, DirtyEFT, Stock, Derivative,
E-Money. Once the selection of first MLS is made, we create the linked MLS
series based on considerations such as geography, money-amount, time,
complexity, difficulty of tracking. The trails were created considering different
levels of criteria, the randomization of the criteria is uniformly distributed. The
Full-Trail feeds were created by the generator that does not exceed 10 levels of
depth of linked MLSs. The trails are either a variant or a subsection of one of
the real-life cases that are similar in terms of complexity and people involved
to the case explained previously.
At the normal speed, of one event at one time tick of the CEP system, the test
result is zero for the false positive rates and false negative rates. It is highly
improbable to get a false positive trail due to the business rules that define
them, and due to the accuracy and granular level of linking transactions. We
did not get any false positive schema in the MLS tests, due to the synthetic
nature of the data. When we increased the speed of the feed of data generated
to 10 times and 100 times the normal speed, we observed a FPR and FNR in
the objects detected (Full-Trail). Increasing the speed of data-feed processing
did not produce FPR and NFR for single MLS, but it produced FPR and FNR
for pair MLS at speed 100X. The term “object” in the graph refers to the three
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different patterns of single MLS, pair MLS, and Full-Trail in the proprietary
test of the specific object (Object in the first pattern test refers to the first
pattern single MLS, in the second to MLS pair, in the third to Full-Trail). The
values of FRP and FNR reflect the number of falsely detected objects.

Figure 6 Details and False Detection Results of Test I

Test with subtle noise: This is the most relevant test of the accuracy of our
detection algorithms. The goal is to mislead the detection algorithms to
generate both a false positive and false negative, with the use of subtle
synthetic data. The test has three separate phases: injecting the scheme
participants, injecting subtle transactions, and inserting similar MLS. A subtle
transaction means an identical transaction with ±5% of an actual transaction
amount in a MLS. A similar MLS means an identical MLS with the same set of
participants but with the MLS value is ±10% of the laundered amount of the
MLS. The injection speed was performed at normal processing speed, 10 times
faster speed, and 100 times faster speed. The test of injecting transactions and
MLS is setup considering each MLS type. For example, in the test of smurfing
we create only smurfing MLS and smurfing transactions that can extend
vertically up to 20 levels of depth and horizontally to 30 levels of depth. When
generating the MLSs, our measures vary based on the MLS. We do not use
artificially created none-real life cases. For example, we did not use a smurfing
MLS with 100 levels deep, as that is uncommon and impractical to launder
money using such MLS. We do not inject other MLSs into the injection testing
of specific MLS. However, in the Full-Trail testing we inject all the types of
MLS. By design of full-Trail it is required that we related different types of
MLS under the same Full-Trail.
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As it can be seen from Figures 7-9, the test produced low FNR and low FPR
for transaction and MLS injection when the phases were executed at normal
processing speed. Those rates increased in the phases when tests were
executed at faster processing speed. One way to imitate the data feed pace of
real production environment is to run the CEP tests at faster pace, which means
overloading the system with processing and analytics while attempting to keep
pace with the data feed. The goal was to evaluate the effectiveness of “FullTrail” detection when the system absorbs data at a higher rate while
performing the analysis. Due to the design methodology of detection
algorithms and the complexity of the business rules of MLS detection, their
false detection rates stayed at low levels even with injection similar
transactions and MLSs, at a higher data-feed speed.
Meeting the design principles, the “Full-Trail” and “Suspicious-Trail” results
remained at low rates for both false positive and false negative. Therefore, all
the subtle single MLS created with our injected data ended in the “MissingTrail”s, where they do not exceed the depth of 3 consecutive MLSs. Among
the reasons for such success in trail analysis and avoiding any negative impact
are the following: (1) Designing MLEDF in such a strict and granular method,
especially for matching the MLSs within the trails; (2) Using the SNA in the
trail analysis algorithms; and (3) Adopting the criterion of following the
direction of the money flow. MLS is not expected to terminate with funds
remaining in the account. The money must flow in some direction in order to
be laundered, or must be withdrawn by the launderer.

Figure 7 Details and False Detection Results of Test II-Entity Injection

64

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(3)

Figure 8 Details and False Detection Results of Test II-Transaction Injection

Figure 9 Details and False Detection Results of Test II- Similar MLS Injection

Test with longer synthetic full-trails: This is the hardest level of performancetesting of the system and accuracy-testing of the detection algorithms. The
dataset is permutated over a repository of the different real-life cases.
Afterwards, the dataset is combined with randomized MLS to generate deep
vertical levels of “Full-Trail” and “Suspicious-Trail”. The randomization
follows the same principles we used in Test II, the injection testing. The test is
designed to assess the performance of MLEDF in capturing real-life data and
analyzing them on the fly. The desired test result is to generate low FPR and
FNR. The test module generates all synthetic data from real-life cases. The test
is as similar as it can be to real-life scenarios, considering that there are limited
ways to manipulate a MLS. The test program functions as follows: (1) Set a
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trail depth. The program enters a loop and builds a trail by choosing a first
scheme from of each MLS type at random, as it was described in Test I in
building the Full-Trails; (2) The loop continues by creating an MLS that can be
linked by funds, time, location and complexity wise to the current MLS. We
repeat the step above with the exception of not creating any Smurfing MLS for
the rest of the levels; (3) The permutation continues until we reach the last
level, where we always choose an MLS of type DirtyEFT with withdrawal, in
order to generate the trail termination point, as by definition a trail will end
with withdrawal; (4) The test repeats the process of trail generation forever,
and at the maximum possible speed; and (5) The testing module saves the
arrival time of the last DirtyEFT and subtracts that from the build time of the
trail. Thereby, we obtain the difference in Milliseconds, which represents the
time duration for trail processing.
The data was generated for worst-case scenarios. By doing so we ensure that
the generated data is more complex and that the performance is evaluated only
in most resource consuming cases. Displayed results represent the performance
of data generated without any repetitive bosses or associates. Hence, the
dataset is consumes a significant number of resource

Figure 10 False Detection Results and Details of Test III

3.4 Data Characteristics
We introduced six MLS types with different subtypes for each sector. The
combination of schemes is novel in its entirety as they were driven from reallife cases. The novelty lies in: (1) creating patterns from real life cases using
CEP system; (2) developing a software that can read patterns from real-life or
synthetic cases and evolve it based on criteria we implemented; and (3)
attempting to link the networks of from those cases to produce different MLS
variations that involve all well-known MLS.
In the first test, we used the StreamBase (SB) simulator (StreamBase 2012,
2013) and MLS DB to feed data into the application. In the tests of the MLS
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pair and “Full-Trail”, the simulator retrieves the DB data and generates
samples. In the single MLS test, we feed the DB data into the simulator to
generate samples from a pool of a specific set of MLS. The “Full-Trail” dataset
contains variants and subsections from five real-life cases. The dataset was in
CVS format, and contained 292,000 MLS records that constituted a total of
12,000 “Full-Trail” records. The dataset contained 1.4 million transactions. In
the second test, we used a modified version of the dataset that contains subtle
transactions and identical MLSs. We injected 20,000 identical MLS and 95,000
subtle transactions using the simulator. In the third test, we implemented a Java
program to stream the generated data into the MLEDF.
4.5 Testing Performance
In order to test performance using the environment described above, we
executed three major tests over three different data sets. The third simulation
test was the most crucial test, as the data feed resembles the data feed seen on a
daily basis in a bank or in a brokerage house.
The processing ratio is ideal, obviously workable to be faster. The trail
processing time decreases with the deeper trails because there are less MLS per
object in this case. However, it is a good indicator because it means that in
more healthy situations, the system will be faster in responding to troubles. The
processing time both for objects and MLSs is set to be ideal on 20-depth trails.
This implies that the system is more suitable to trails of that particular depth.
With our assessed speed to get ~0.5 objects/millisecond processing, and for
such a system, this is significant. While the processing ratio can be very
subjective to the number of markets, for banks and other feeds connected to the
system, a productive version of a system like this will need to be scaled in
order to meet that ratio.

Figure 11 Performance Test Results
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4.6 The Validation Statement
We used the SB Studio Feed Simulation platform for performing our tests
during the validation: (1) to connect it to module generator of Test III to
retrieve the deep Full-Trails; (2) to connect it to the data-feed we used in Test
II; and (3) to create noise-free pure data in Test I. Although there are higher
performance opportunities promised by vendors, SB in particular, we observed
that our queries reveal reasonable outcomes in terms of performance tests, even
using this none-enterprise test environment. We also observed that the queries
result in reasonable accuracy values given the specially crafted synthetic data
sets. Given the data set, we successfully determined a reasonable window size
for window-based queries. Using attributes, we could also successfully
converge the evidence outcomes by tuning the force of time, property, and keybased patterns directing those queries.
RELATED WORK
The system created by FINCEN AI System (FAIS) (Senator et al., 1995, 1998)
is a similar system in terms of the concept of detecting MLS. The drawback of
the system is that it does not capture live data (i.e., running data connected to
banking systems) and requires the involvement of an expert in the link
analysis, and tying MLS and transactions. Whereas our system does not need
the involvement of an expert and captures live, as well as feeds the data into
the SB engine. The KDPrevent system (Jacobs et al., 2003; Kuns et al., 2004)
is the most private product that is similar to our product in terms of the logic of
including the background of the transactions of individual and groups. The
KDPrevent system is also based on data mining techniques that is not real-time
and necessitates the involvement of experts. Gunestas, et al. (2010) conducted
a similar study in the financial transaction forensics, with a focus only on Ponzi
schemes. The framework only captures one form of transaction only from the
web services transactions. Our framework can be accepted as a continuance to
(Gunestas et al., 2010) for MLS and accepting all forms of transactions,
including the banking transactions.
6. CONCLUSION
We have created a framework to detect the evolution of MLS and implemented
a system to include SNA for detecting and linking related ML networks. The
linkage will function properly even when all evidence is unavailable. We
defined the choreographies that could be used to detect the evolution of the
sophisticated MLS. We have shown how to detect and capture the evolving and
complex trails of MLS using SB. Although our choreographies only specify
well-known money laundering schemes, the framework can be updated with
business rules to capture any form of other MLS that can be mined from
repositories of financial transactions. Our ongoing work addresses the
extension of our method in developing an online warning system that detects
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MLS that appear legitimate from an abstract view, but are illegitimate from the
detailed view. Currently, we are working to produce algorithms to prevent
transactions from a sequence of financial transactions, based on our detection
system and proprietary scoring system.
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